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Arbitration and State Action
Sarah Rudolph Cole.∗
The increasing popularity of arbitration among employers and
businesses has triggered skepticism and concern among the plaintiffs’
employment discrimination bar and consumer advocacy groups. Groups
critical of the use of arbitration often characterize the very advantages of
this
mechanism—its
streamlined
procedures,
speed,
and
confidentiality—as problematic. According to them, streamlined
procedures and speed may disproportionately impact the party who had
less bargaining power when the parties negotiated the original
agreement. Confidentiality suggests surreptitious and underhanded
tactics swept under the rug.1 With little empirical support, critics,
particularly of the use of predispute arbitration agreements, began an
attack in the mid-1990s to unseat arbitration as a popular mechanism for
dispute resolution among employers and employees, as well as
businesses and consumers.2
The attack on arbitration has taken different forms over time.
Originally, plaintiffs asserted a type of jurisdictional challenge, claiming
that statutory claims, such as discrimination, fell outside the scope of

∗ Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. My thanks to E. Gary
Spitko, Douglas R. Cole, June Carbone, Ruth Colker, Ned Foley, David Goldberger, Brad Joondeph,
Ron Krotoszynski, Marc Spindelman, Stephen J. Ware, and the participants in a faculty workshop at
the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. Additional thanks to Kristen Blankely, Sabrina Riggs, and Natalie Hostacky for their
research assistance.
1. Several courts have found that a confidentiality provision in an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable because such provisions favor the repeat participant in the arbitration process by
making it difficult to determine whether the arbitrator or the arbitration process was biased.
Moreover, courts find that the lack of public disclosure of arbitration results may favor repeat
players over individuals. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 53 (2003); Plaskett v. Bechtel Int’l, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 (D.V.I. 2003); Acorn v.
Household Fin. Corp., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp.
III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1182–83 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
2. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for
Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 275 (1990); Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman
Claims Arbiters of Bias are Biased, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1. Senator Russell
Feingold also introduced legislation designed to invalidate predispute arbitration agreements
between employers and employees. See S. Res. 2405, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994); HR Res. 4981,
103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994). The proposed legislation was never enacted.
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arbitration agreements.3 Repeated failure of that claim precipitated a
redirection of effort. Today, challenges to arbitration primarily focus on
contractual theories, particularly unconscionability.4 While the ultimate
verdict on this tactic is still out, arbitration’s critics have sought to open
another front in the war on arbitration. In particular, they have begun
leveling constitutional attacks against employment and consumer
arbitration, contending that all forms of arbitration, whether courtordered or contractual, are subject to the Constitution’s procedural due
process requirements.5
A necessary prerequisite for constitutional challenges to arbitration,
however, is some theory under which arbitration constitutes state action.
Constitutional prohibitions, after all, apply only to state action.6 Of
course, state action is easier to see in some forms of arbitration than in
others. For example, court-ordered arbitration, when a court mandates
that the parties participate in arbitration as a prerequisite to a court filing,
clearly involves state action.7 A second form of arbitration, agencyinitiated arbitration, occurs when an agency requires entities it regulates
to register with a private organization that utilizes arbitration to resolve
disputes involving its registrants. Although mandatory registration may
create state action when the private organization mandates participation
in arbitration, commentators have largely ignored this issue when

3. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (rejecting such
a claim).
4. Unconscionability is the primary means used to challenge employer or business-drafted
arbitration agreements. Courts have been fairly receptive to these challenges, striking down
arbitration agreements as unconscionable when class actions are prohibited, when an employee must
pay an arbitrator’s fees or a high filing fee, or when the arbitral process is skewed in favor of the
employer or business. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003);
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. 1998).
5. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 109
(1992); Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages
Awards, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 583 (1995); Jeffery L. Fisher, State Action and the Enforcement of
Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Against Employment Discrimination Claims, 18 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 289, 295–97 (2000); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000); Jean R.
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1493 (1997).
6. The Constitution applies to nongovernmental actors in some situations. For example, the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits all people from owning or being slaves. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
7. See infra Part II.A.
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contemplating reform of the securities arbitration process.8 Courts have
examined the question, but have universally rejected a finding of state
action in this context.9 This article will demonstrate that, at least in the
securities industry, since the SEC imposes a requirement that brokers and
dealers register with a private self-regulatory organization (SRO), state
action is present when SROs mandate that brokers and dealers participate
in arbitration.
Finally, there is contractual arbitration, that is, arbitration that arises
out of an agreement between two private parties. At least as an initial
matter, it is difficult to see how agreements between private parties
regarding arbitration involve state action. Critics, however, have
developed a theory of state action in this context to attempt to allow them
to overcome this hurdle. Under this arbitration as state action theory,
critics contend that contractual arbitration gives rise to state action when
courts enforce contractual commitments to participate in arbitration and
when courts subsequently enforce arbitration awards.10 If contractual
arbitration is state action, then the arbitral forum must satisfy the
constitutional requirements of the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses.
Because a finding of state action in any type of arbitration would
have significant, and likely adverse, implications on the continued use of
arbitration, careful consideration of whether state action is present in
arbitration is necessary. This article attempts to provide that analysis and
offers a critique of the arbitration as state action theory that others have
advanced.
Courts have had several opportunities to address the question of
whether judicial enforcement of contractual arbitration agreements rises
to the level of state action. Interestingly, courts and commentators are
deeply divided on the question of whether state action is present in
contractual arbitration. Every federal court considering the question has

8. Stephen J. Ware is a notable exception. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration
and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 145–46 (1996) (noting that because “securities
laws constitute an occupational licensing scheme that conditions a license to be a securities
employee” on an agreement to arbitrate, state action is present.). See also Karl E. Neudorfer,
Defining Due Process Down: Punitive Awards and Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes, 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 207, 231–40 (1999).
9. Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002); Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144
F.3d 1182, 1200–02 (9th Cir. 1998).
10. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 5 (arguing that mandatory arbitration involves state
action).
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concluded that there is no state action present in contractual arbitration.11
Yet virtually every commentator addressing the same issue has
concluded that the opposite is true.12 What accounts for this
extraordinary dichotomy is not clear. Perhaps the muddied waters of the
state action doctrine are responsible. More likely, the commentators
interested in this issue, particularly Professors Reuben and Sternlight, are
hopeful that encouraging the adoption of the state action doctrine in
arbitration will accomplish by constitutional means what legislatures
have failed to provide—a wholesale cessation of the use of predispute
arbitration agreements between one-shot and repeat players, such as
employers and employees.13 Courts, by contrast, enamored with the

11. See Perpetual Sec., 290 F.3d at 137–39; Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts, Inc., 167 F.3d
361, 368–69 (7th Cir. 1999); Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206–07; Lodal v. Home Ins. Co. of Ill., 156 F.3d
1230 (table), No. 95-2187, 1998 WL 393766, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998); Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1200–02;
United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Safeway, Inc., 165 F.3d 918 (table), No. 98-15148,
1998 WL 904719, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190–92 (11th
Cir. 1995); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987);
Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986); Dluhos v. Strasberg, No. 00CV-3163, 2001 WL 1720272, at *5, *11, (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d in part, 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003);
Brannon v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins., Co., No. Civ A. 99-3497, 2000 WL 122241, at *5 (E.D. La. 2000);
D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Moorning-Brown v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. No. 96 Civ. 4130 JSR HBP, 2000 WL 16935, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Century Aluminum of W. Va. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 82 F. Supp. 2d 580, 583 n.4 (S.D. W.
Va. 2000); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 840–41 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (following Eleventh Circuit law
despite disagreement regarding arbitration as state action); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 190
F.R.D. 134, 137–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); McDonough v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United
States, No. 98 Civ. 3921 (BSJ), 1999 WL 731424, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Cremin v. Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1465–70 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Mantle v. The
Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719, 734–35 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709, at *10–13 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Cort v. Am. Arbitration
Ass’n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 973 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
No state courts have found state action in contractual arbitration, and only one state court
suggests that a state action finding is possible. See Williams v. O’Connor, 310 N.W.2d 825, 826
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981). One federal district court stated in dicta that it “respectfully doubts that the
rationale for the result set forth in Davis . . .—viz. that an arbitration award involves no state
action—is well-founded.” Commonwealth Assocs. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 n.37
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
12. See Brunet, supra note 5, at 109; Davis, supra note 5, at 583; Fisher, supra note 5, at
295–297; Reuben, supra note 5, at 992; Sternlight, supra note 5, at 40. But see Stephen J. Ware,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal
Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 559–67 (1994).
13. Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost—How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 1–10 (1994);
Reuben, supra note 5, at 1032 (arguing that courts do not scrutinize repeat player and one-shot
player agreements carefully enough); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of
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efficiency of arbitration, would prefer not to undermine the process by
finding state action. Whatever the reason, additional attention to this
question, and to the question of whether agency-initiated arbitration
involves state action, would provide normative benefits for courts and
commentators alike.
In Part I, this Article will offer a basic outline of the Court’s current
state action doctrine. In Part II, the Article will use the Court’s basic
approach and apply it to three different types of arbitration: (1) courtordered arbitration, (2) agency-initiated arbitration, and (3) contractual
arbitration. The application of the state action doctrine in these contexts
yields quite different results and suggests that constitutional violations
that arise in private dispute resolution procedures are not actionable
under the constitution while violations in agency-initiated arbitration, at
least in the securities industry, as well as court-ordered arbitration, are.
Part II will also critique current commentary and judicial decisions on
the question of whether state action is present in agency-initiated or
contractual arbitration. Part III offers a brief conclusion.
I. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s state action doctrine explains that
constitutional protections of individual rights and liberties apply only to
the actions of governmental bodies.14 Unless the person or entity charged
with a constitutional violation is acting on behalf of the state, no
constitutional action against that person or entity can be maintained.15
The state action doctrine is important because it assures the maintenance
of the public/private dichotomy that lies at the very heart of liberal
democratic theory.16 In order to maintain the dichotomy, the state action

Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017,
1020 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (noting that
private parties’ actions lie outside the scope of the Constitution’s protection generally).
15. See, e.g., id. at 624 (holding that a private litigant’s exercise of peremptory challenges
invokes the formal authority of the court and is state action).
16. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 44–73 (T. Peardon ed., Prentice
Hall 1952) (1690); Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1288–
89 (2000); G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
Governmental Responsibility (Part I), 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 336 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 535–36 (1985); Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private
Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 209 (2001).

5

1COL-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/11/2005 11:34:45 AM

[2005

doctrine dictates that courts must carefully consider the implications of
extending to nongovernmental actors constitutional norms designed to
limit governmental power. Proper consideration is essential to ensure that
the boundaries between judicial and legislative authority are
maintained,17 that constitutional norms are not extended so far that they
become liberty-infringing rather than liberty-enhancing,18 and that
federal governmental authority remains properly circumscribed.19 At the
same time, a state action doctrine is necessary in order to prevent the
state from doing through private actors what it could not do for itself:
infringe on or violate the rights of others.
While the theory underlying state action is well understood,
determining whether an individual is a state actor when she allegedly
violates constitutional rights is not easily predictable. As numerous
commentators have stated, predicting when and under what
circumstances state action exists is both one of the more difficult and
important questions confronting the federal courts today.20
The threshold inquiry in any case involving a private individual or
entity accused of violating a person’s constitutional rights is whether that

17. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982) (noting that court
enforcement of state action transfers authority from the legislative to judicial branch, rendering the
regulatory framework subject to judicial modification); Costa del Moral v. Servicios Legales de
Puerto Rico, 63 F. Supp. 2d 165, 172 (D.P.R. 1999); Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638, 642 (E.D.
Mo. 1995); Total Television Entm’t Corp. v. Chestnut Hill Vill. Assocs., 145 F.R.D. 375, 378–79
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Smith v. Wood, 649 F. Supp. 901, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Matter of Johnson, 460
N.Y.S.2d 932, 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (Niehoff, J., dissenting).
18. For example, procedural due process requirements that ensure governmental action is
neither arbitrary nor capricious would greatly disrupt the operation of a private business or dispute
resolution system. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 535–36 (“[T]he doctrine protects individual
liberty by defining a zone of private conduct that does not have to comply with the Constitution.”).
19. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936; Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978); Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12 (1883);
Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Emergency Med. Servs. of Northeastern Pa., 712 F.2d 878, 879 (3d Cir. 1983);
Elam v. Montgomery County, 573 F. Supp. 797, 803 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Chemerinsky, supra
note 16, at 536 (“[L]imiting the Constitution’s protections to state action preserves state sovereignty
by giving the states almost complete authority to regulate private behavior.”).
20. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (asserting that state action is a “conceptual disaster
area”); Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 503; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An
Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 302, 304 (1995) (applying the state action test is difficult); Reuben, supra note 5, at 990;
Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 TOURO L. REV. 775, 776
(2000) (noting the Supreme Court’s silence on the issue); Ware, supra note 12, at 559; R. George
Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1989).
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private entity may be regarded as a state actor.21 According to Supreme
Court jurisprudence, private conduct becomes state action in three
situations. First, state action exists when the government becomes
excessively entangled with private behavior and encourages or causes the
unconstitutional behavior.22 Second, state action exists when a private
entity performs what is traditionally an exclusively public function.23
Third, state action exists when the private actor and the government have
a “symbiotic relationship.”24
In the case of court-ordered, agency-initiated, and contractual
arbitration, the only relevant categories are the first two: entanglement
and public function.25 Thus, only those two state action tests will be
addressed here.

21. Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 314.
22. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding no close nexus between private school’s personnel decisions and state
even though state extensively regulates school); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding
that the state is not responsible for nursing home decision to transfer patients even though state
extensively regulates nursing homes); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165–66; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357;
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378
(1967); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d
301, 311 (4th Cir. 2001); Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2000); DeBauche
v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999).
23. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S.
at 842; Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
24. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (defining symbiotic relationship)).
25. To establish a symbiotic relationship that turns a private entity into a state actor, courts
engage in a “highly contextual” inquiry that focuses on whether the private entity receives state
subsidies or aid. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722–23; A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 123 (2000) (citing
J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 698 (D. Ariz. 1993)). In Burton, the Court emphasized that the
correct inquiry involved “sifting facts and weighing circumstances” to determine if there is a
symbiotic relationship. 365 U.S. at 722. The Court determined in Burton that the public funds
provided to the facility, together with state agency ownership and operation, created a symbiotic
relationship. Id. Burton was the high watermark for the symbiotic relationship test. Today, the Court
will find symbiotic relationships only in cases involving direct governmental aid to the alleged state
actor. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.4, at 528 (6th ed. 2000). In
arbitration, direct government subsidies to the alleged wrongdoer, the arbitral litigant, are
nonexistent. Even when the government pays the neutral private third party, which happens only in
court-ordered arbitration, application of the symbiotic relationship test will result in a finding that
the arbitrator is a state actor, a fact that this article concedes. Because no direct subsidy is provided
to the arbitral litigants in court-ordered or contractual arbitration, the symbiotic relationship test is
inapposite.
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A. Entanglement
To determine whether government is entangled in private conduct, a
court considers whether there is such a close nexus between the state and
the challenged action that the action may be “fairly treated as that of the
State itself.”26 Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or
acquiescence of the state is not state action;27 entanglement may only be
found if the challenged activity results from the state’s provision of
“significant encouragement, either overt or covert.”28
The question of whether the nexus between the state and the private
action is sufficiently close to transform the private party into a public
party has always been a fact-intensive inquiry.29 Nevertheless, certain
principles guide Supreme Court jurisprudence. Essentially, the Supreme
Court divides entanglement cases into two categories: (1) cases that
involve direct or indirect racial decision making, and (2) cases that do
not involve race-based classifications. To understand how the Court
would analyze arbitration—specifically, enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitration awards—one must first understand how the
Court approaches each category. Once the Supreme Court’s analysis of
each category is understood, this article will consider whether arbitration
falls into category one or category two and then apply the appropriate
state action analysis. A finding that there is state action in any type of
arbitration would result in substantial revision of the arbitration process
in order to bring it into conformity with constitutional due process
requirements.
1. The intersection of race and state action
A review of cases involving direct and indirect racial decision
making suggests that the Court is more willing to find state action when
a court must determine a party’s skin color in order to ascertain the

26. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351); see also Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 170;
Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173.
27. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004–05; Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164–65; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
28. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
29. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295–96; Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 939
(1982) (stating that the state action determination is a “necessarily fact-bound inquiry”); Burton, 365
U.S. at 726 (explaining that a state action finding “can be determined only in the framework of the
peculiar facts or circumstances present”); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349–50; Moose Lodge, 407
U.S. at 172 (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 722).
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correct outcome.30 So, for instance, as discussed more fully below,
enforcement of a private contract that prevents sales to African
Americans would entail state action (as it requires the court to ascertain a
party’s skin color to know whether the provision was violated),
notwithstanding that the contractual provision itself was the result of
choices made by seemingly private actors.31 By contrast, the Court will
not find state action when a party seeks to enforce a facially neutral law
but does so in a discriminatory manner (for example, a homeowner who
only reports trespassing when the trespasser is Hispanic). The reason,
perhaps, is that, because the Court is not called upon to expressly
participate in the racial decision making (that is, the court need not
ascertain a party’s skin color to resolve the trespassing complaint), the
nexus, and thus the entanglement, is more attenuated.32 Thus, an
important factor in assessing the role of state action in arbitration is to
determine the nature of the Court’s involvement in racial decision
making.
In this section, the article analyzes the cases that most clearly
elaborate the Court’s jurisprudence on the intersection between race and
state action: Shelley v. Kraemer,33 Bell v. Maryland,34 and Evans v.
Abney.35 After reconstructing the Court’s basic state action framework in
this area, the article will then more closely examine those cases that
commentators have argued are perhaps the most similar factually to the
arbitration context; namely, those cases in which the Court has addressed
whether a private litigant is a state actor when he exercises a peremptory
challenge to a juror in court.
Shelley involved landowners attempting to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant to prevent Shelley, an African-American, from
taking possession of property subject to that covenant.36 The Court
concluded that when private parties seek to enforce racially restrictive
covenants in court, and the court requires compliance with the
discriminatory covenants, the seemingly private enforcement effort
becomes state action.37 Thus, according to the Court in Shelley, state
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
See id.; infra Part II.C.
See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
396 U.S. 435 (1970).
334 U.S. at 5–6.
Id. at 20.
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action is present when a court commands a private party to comply with
a private contract that requires racial discrimination. Following Shelley,
then, a judicial finding of entanglement is more likely when private
parties seek judicial assistance to enforce racially discriminatory
agreements.38
Many commentators worried about Shelley ’s possible implications.
According to some, Shelley could be interpreted to create state action in
any contract dispute that resulted in court involvement.39 Concerns over
Shelley ’s implications never materialized, however. The Court, perhaps
concerned about the loss of the critical dichotomy between public and
private law and the constitutionalization of contract law, has rejected the
invitation to extend Shelley.40 Since Shelley, no other case has found
state action solely on the basis that the court enforced an otherwise
private arrangement.41
.

.

38. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1959) (“[A]n employer may freely contract with a union to
maintain a lily-white shop, but that the provision is one which fails whenever the employer’s selfinterest so dictates: the union cannot coerce compliance through an injunction or an award of
damages.”).
39. Some commentators caution against an extension of Shelley, fearing the consequences the
constitutionalization of contract law would have on private interaction. See, e.g., Mark C. Alexander,
Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 24
(1999); Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and Private Worlds, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 709 (1989); Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 505; Lino A. Graglia, State Action:
Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777 (1989); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for
a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Kennedy, supra note 16, at 215 n.78;
Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 316; Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary:
“A Time for Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away,” 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61 (1998); Steven Siegal,
The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights in
Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
461, 501 (1998) (arguing that a literal, unbound reading of Shelley could extend to all private
transactions enforced by the courts).
40. Judicial decisions that disadvantage racial minorities do not involve state action unless
there is some nonneutral involvement of the court with the private action. Thus, a court can uphold a
trespass conviction based on a private person’s decision not to allow racial minorities on his
property. Because neither the state nor the court has “prompted or required” the private person’s
discriminatory behavior, state action does not arise. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964);
NOWAK ET AL., supra note 25, § 12.3, at 521. By contrast, in Shelley, the Court interfered in a
private, nondiscriminatory transaction, mandating a racial distinction in the sale of property.
41. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (“[T]he situation presented in this case is also
easily distinguishable from that presented in Shelley . . .”); Bell, 378 U.S. at 328 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (refusing to extend Shelley); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir.
1995) (“[T]he holding of Shelley, however, has not been extended beyond the context of race
discrimination.”); Jojola v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C71-900 SAW, 1973 WL 158166, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (Shelley limited to its facts); Brunet, supra note 12, at 111 (same).
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Commentators have, however, exaggerated Shelley ’s influence. If
the contract the Court enforced in Shelley had not been racially
restrictive on its face, the argument that applying Shelley in subsequent
cases would constitutionalize contracts might be viable.42 Moreover,
Shelley is an unusual case that will not likely be repeated. The Court’s
decision turned on the fact that the lower court had to look at the color of
Shelley’s skin in order to determine whether to enforce the contract.
Without race as a factor, the enforcement of a facially neutral covenant
would not have been state action.43
The Court’s refusal to extend Shelley has resulted in reluctance to
find state action, even in comparable situations where race discrimination
is a consequence of the private litigants’ behavior. For example, in Bell
v. Maryland, the Court considered whether a business owner could use
state trespass laws to prosecute minorities who did not leave his premises
after he refused to serve them at his restaurant.44 While the Court
vacated the trespass convictions on other grounds, the dissent, written by
Justice Black, did not find state action because neither the state nor the
court compelled the private person’s discriminatory behavior.45
Although discriminatory enforcement of laws may result from the private
person’s actions, the government need not question the motives of the
party seeking relief, nor determine the alleged trespassers’ skin color, in
order to enforce the law.46 In other words, when a private actor utilizes a
neutral law in a discriminatory manner, the Court will not find state
action. A majority of the Court ultimately adopted Justice Black’s Bell
dissent and found that a private group or individual’s decision to exclude
minorities from one’s premises did not amount to state action.47
.

42. In Shelley, enforcing the covenant resulted in judicial encouragement of racial
discrimination. Because state encouragement of racial discrimination is a particularly egregious and,
in modern times, a unique use of state power, it is easy to distinguish from judicial enforcement of
facially neutral private contracts.
43. Unlike other cases involving state exercise of coercive power, the Shelley case involved a
court’s enforcement of a covenant that was contrary to the wishes of both parties to the case and
resulted in race discrimination. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). This element likely added
to the Court’s willingness to overturn the lower court decisions. As with the race aspect of Shelley,
this aspect of the case is unusual and unlikely to be repeated.
44. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
45. Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 332 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that there is no state action
when the state does not encourage private club’s decision to restrict membership based on race).
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Similarly, in Evans v. Abney,48 the Court considered whether state
action exists when a court permits land to revert to descendants of a
senator who gave land for a public park on the condition that it would be
for whites only.49 The Court found no state action even though racial
minorities were disadvantaged through the reversion.50 While the city
and park trustees could not run a park that limited admission based on
race, reversion of the park to the senator’s heirs did not result in
discrimination against black persons.51 Instead, it applied equally to all
people who might have benefited from the use of the park. Thus, the
Court held, judicial enforcement of neutral state property laws is not state
action. As in Bell, the Court did not need to determine any party’s skin
color in order to enforce the law. From Bell and Evans evolves the
principle that judicial enforcement of neutral laws that may result in
harm to minority groups does not involve state action unless the court
must expressly participate in racial decision making in order to resolve
the dispute.
As these cases illustrate, the more involved a court is in encouraging
or sanctioning discriminatory behavior, the more likely the court will
find that the private discrimination constitutes state action. Thus, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court viewed judicial oversight of the use of
peremptory challenges to achieve discrimination inside the courtroom as
state action. In a case from the early 1990s, the Supreme Court extended
the Batson v. Kentucky.52 principle to the use of peremptory challenges in
the civil litigation context. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,53 the
Supreme Court applied a two-part inquiry to determine whether the
discriminatory actions of a civil litigant constituted state action. Careful
examination of the cases discussed so far is necessary because the
peremptory challenge process used to select juries is similar to the
process used to select an arbitrator. Thus, a court considering whether
state action is present in contractual arbitration would look to these cases
in conducting its analysis.
In Edmonson, the Court first inquired into “whether the claimed
[constitutional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
48. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
49. Id. at 446.
50. Id. at 445.
51. Id.
52. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
precludes a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge on the basis of race.
53. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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privilege having its source in state authority.”54 In considering the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the Court concisely
answered this question in the affirmative: the Court noted that the state
need not grant any peremptory challenges to a civil litigant or a criminal
defendant, but in doing so invites a private party to help compose a
government actor—the jury.55 “By their very nature, peremptory
challenges have no significance outside of a court of law. Their sole
purpose is to permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of
an impartial trier of fact.”56 The Court emphasized that without the
State’s voluntary authorization of peremptory challenges, the private
party would not be able to engage in the alleged discrimination.57
Second, the Court inquired into “whether the private party charged
with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor.”58
To resolve the latter issue the Court made three additional inquiries:
“[(1)] the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and
benefits; [(2)] whether the actor is performing a traditional government
function; and [(3)] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique
way by the incidents of government authority.”59 The Court answered
each of these questions in the affirmative with respect to peremptory
challenges for both a civil litigant and a criminal defendant.
The Court reached this conclusion both because of the nature of jury
selection and the court’s involvement in the jury selection process. State
action exists because the court “has not only made itself a party to the
[biased act] but has elected to place its power, property, and prestige
behind the [alleged] discrimination.”60 In so doing, the government has
“create[d] the legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct and
in a significant way has involved itself with invidious discrimination.”61
One proponent of a broad state action doctrine in the arbitration
context, Richard Reuben, argues that considered together, Shelley and
Edmonson stand for the proposition that the court’s participation in
enforcing an unlawful private arrangement that would “offend the

54. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939
(1982)); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992).
55. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620–21.
56. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
57. Id. at 621.
58. Id. at 620.
59. Id. at 621–22 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 624 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 US 715, 725 (1961)).
61. Id. (citations omitted).
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Constitution if committed directly by the government” is state action
since it aggravates the constitutional injury suffered in a “unique way
because of the unique place of the courts in a democratic government.”62
In other words, the court’s unique position as an institution integral to
our democratic society imposes on the court an obligation to avoid
enforcing discriminatory arrangements.
Yet this view simply restates what the Court has rejected repeatedly
since deciding Shelley, Bell, and Evans v. Abney— that a court’s
involvement in enforcing neutral private arrangements is state action.
Moreover, Edmonson is a much different case from Shelley.63 since the
court’s involvement in Edmonson is of a deeper nature. In Edmonson, the
parties were involved in the creation of the jury, which is “the
quintessential governmental body.”64 The jury will interact closely with
the judge and will share with her decision-making functions. Permitting
discriminatory jury selection impugns the function of the court system
and affirms discriminatory behavior. Thus, the entanglement between
judge and jury is much more intimate than between a judge and private
parties attempting to enforce a contract that results in discrimination. As
such, it would seem more problematic than the discriminatory behavior
that the Shelley Court found to be state action.
In addition, the discriminatory conduct in Edmonson takes place in
the courtroom itself following procedures the court articulated.65 That
the government permits the discrimination to take place within a public
courtroom, the Court reasoned, exacerbates the injury caused by the
discrimination because it “mars the integrity of the judicial system and
prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.”66
The role of the courts in our democracy requires that the court acts with
institutional integrity when conducting proceedings. To maintain
institutional integrity, a court must avoid the appearance of engaging in
discriminatory behavior; and it cannot maintain its integrity if it presides
over discriminatory action without attempting to prevent it. Moreover,
presiding over discriminatory behavior is quite different from using
neutral legal principles to enforce a private contract without inquiring
into the underlying subject matter of the contract. In such a situation, the
.

62. Reuben, supra note 5, at 1009.
63. In Edmonson, the Court stated that “[t]he alleged state action here is a far cry from that
which the Court found, for example, in Shelley v. Kraemer.” Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 635.
64. Id. at 624.
65. Id. at 616.
66. Id. at 628.
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court’s integrity as an institution capable of applying neutral laws is not
in jeopardy.
Finally, Edmonson is a case that involves significant state coercion.
A juror is in court as a result of the issuance of a subpoena.67 If a juror
does not come to court in response to a judicial request for his presence,
he can be held in contempt of court.68 Thus, in Edmonson, concern arises
because the state coerces jurors into appearing in court, subjects them to
public examination, compels them to remain, and then permits
discrimination against them. State acts of coercion, when the parties have
no alternative to appearing or complying, are more likely to rise to the
level of state action. Ultimately, coercion, together with race
discrimination, rises to the level of state action. While both of these
elements are present in Edmonson, and in court-ordered as well as
agency-initiated arbitration, the absence of either factor in the case of
contractual arbitration is fatal.
Shelley, Bell, Evans v. Abney, and Edmonson provide an appropriate
framework to consider whether judicial involvement in private, agencyinitiated, and court-ordered arbitration is state action when race is an
issue. While the analysis may change depending on the type of
arbitration at issue, these decisions establish the parameters a court will
use to analyze whether court involvement in a private or semiprivate
arbitral setting is racially motivated or racially neutral.
2. Nonrace-based entanglement cases
The Supreme Court’s nonrace-based entanglement jurisprudence
focuses primarily on private party use of statutory schemes to enforce
rights and is relevant to the question of whether contractual arbitration
involves state action because contractual arbitration involves private
party use of the Federal Arbitration Act or state equivalent to ensure
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. A review of the
seminal cases in this area, Flagg Bros. v. Brooks.69 and Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co.,70 reveals that the Court is extremely reluctant to find
state action when private parties utilize statutory schemes to enforce

67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1866(b), 1866(g) (2003) (jurors will be summoned to appear and, if they fail
to appear, will be required to come to court and show good cause why they did not appear or be
subject to fine or imprisonment); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21 (West 2002).
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4132 (West 2003).
69. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
70. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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rights even when they make use of the judicial system to accomplish
their goals. Unless the state becomes actively involved in the deprivation
of the complaining party’s right, as by seizing property (Lugar), the court
will not find state action arising from private party use of a statutory
scheme. These cases are relevant for considering whether private party
use of the statutory arbitration process for enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards amounts to state action. Because this article
ultimately concludes that the rules governing arbitration are facially
neutral, the Flagg-Lugar analysis would be applied to assess whether
state action is present when a private party seeks enforcement of an
arbitration agreement. Applying this doctrine to arbitration, a court
should conclude that there is no state action in contractual arbitration.
Application of this test to agency-initiated and court-ordered arbitration,
by contrast, results in a state action finding.
Flagg exemplifies the Court’s reluctance to find state action when
race issues are absent.71 In Flagg, the Court considered whether a
warehouse company’s use of a state statutory scheme to force a sale of
goods in order to enforce a possessory lien was state action.72 In Flagg, a
warehouse company stored Brooks’ possessions when Brooks was
evicted from her apartment. When Brooks did not pay the storage costs,
Flagg Brothers proposed to sell Brooks’ goods, as the New York
Uniform Commercial Code section 7-210 authorizes.73 Brooks sued to
enjoin the sale, and the Supreme Court ultimately considered whether
Flagg Brothers’ sale of her goods was state action that would need to
comply with constitutional due process requirements.
The Court considered both whether the resolution of private disputes
is a traditional public function74 and whether Flagg Brothers’ action was
properly attributable to the state. In deciding that the state was not
responsible for the actions of a private party, the Court emphasized that
the state’s “mere acquiescence” in a private action does not create state
action.75 Thus, the creation of a state statute that does not prohibit certain
private behavior cannot be said to encourage that behavior. In other
words, the state is not responsible for the private decision of a party to
71. 436 U.S. 149.
72. Id. at 151–52.
73. Id. at 153.
74. Whether dispute resolution is a traditional governmental function will be discussed infra
at Part I.B.
75. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
(1974)).
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utilize a statutory scheme to force a sale of goods that “permits but does
not compel” such action.76
Since Flagg, the Court has found state action in only one nonracebased commercial case, Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co..77 Thus, Lugar, in
part, establishes the parameters of the state action doctrine in the
nonrace-based context. In Lugar, a creditor wished to obtain a writ for
prejudgment attachment of a debtor’s property. The clerk of court signed
the writ and the county sheriff enforced it by attaching Lugar’s
property.78 The Lugar Court announced a two-part test for determining
whether state action exists: “First, the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State, or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible . . . .”79 Second, the plaintiff must establish that the action is
fairly attributable to the state because the private actor acted together
with the state, received significant aid from the state, or engaged in
conduct for which the state should be responsible.80
The Court found that the first part of the test was satisfied because
the state created the statutory scheme permitting an individual to obtain a
writ of attachment.81 Applying the second prong, the Court found the
cooperation of the party and the sheriff sufficient to constitute state
action, explaining that “a private party’s joint participation with state
officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize
that party as a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”82 Thus, the Court in Lugar held that a private party’s ex
parte application for attachment, when state officials perform the actual
attachment, amounts to state action.
At first glance, Lugar and Flagg appear to be remarkably similar
cases with inexplicably opposing outcomes. Yet closer analysis reveals a
fundamental difference between the two cases: in Lugar, the sheriff was
directly involved in dispossessing the debtor of his property, while in
Flagg, the warehouse company engaged in self-help to seize the property
in dispute. The Court used this distinction as a basis for reconciling the
cases, indicating that a state official’s participation in a private party’s
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 165.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
Id. at 924–25.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id.
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action is “sufficient to characterize that party as a ‘state actor’ for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”83 As Erwin Chemerinsky later
emphasized, “in Flagg Brothers, involvement of the sheriff was
unnecessary precisely because the state’s law allowed the repossession
action without assistance of the sheriff.”84 Thus, private actions that do
not deal with race do not rise to the level of state action absent some
overt assistance from state officials.
The Supreme Court’s most recent commercial state action case,
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,85 serves to
reinforce the notion that state action is a rare commodity in nonracebased cases. In Sullivan, the Court examined Pennsylvania’s workers’
compensation scheme. Under this scheme, an employer found liable for
an employee’s work-related injury, is responsible for all “reasonable and
necessary” medical expenses.86 In 1993, Pennsylvania created a
utilization review organization (URO) to evaluate contested workers’
compensation claims. Under the 1993 legislation, insurers were
authorized to withhold payment of workers’ compensation benefits to
employees after the insurer filed a claim with the URO asserting that the
payments were not reasonable and necessary.87 The claimants in
Sullivan, ten employees and two employee organizations who received
benefits under the act, sued defendants, two Pennsylvania program
administrators and private insurance companies that offered workers’
compensation coverage.88 The claimants contended that the state’s
creation of a system designed to permit withholding of payments was
state action, which denied them due process because withholding
occurred without proper notice or hearing.
Applying Lugar, the Court stated that claimants must show both that
a constitutional deprivation of a state-created right or privilege had
occurred and that the “party charged with the deprivation [is] a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”89 Acknowledging that the
1993 amendments may encourage insurers to withhold payments for
disputed medical treatment, the Court concluded that the second

83. Id.
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, State Action, in 618 PRACTICING LAW INSITITUTE, LITIGATION
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES—LITIGATION 183, 213 (1999).
85. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
86. Id. at 44.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id. at 47.
89. Id. at 50 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
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requirement was not satisfied by a demonstration that the state
encouraged the behavior. According to the Court,
subtle encouragement is no more significant than that which inheres in
the State’s creation or modification of any legal remedy. We have
never held that the mere availability of a remedy for wrongful conduct,
even when the private use of that remedy serves important public
interests, so significantly encourages the private activity so as to make
the State responsible for it.90

In other words, a scheme that enables or even encourages withholding
payment will not create state action when the decision whether to
withhold is made by the private insurer acting alone.91
The Court also considered whether a private party’s use of a statecreated dispute resolution system imbued the private action with state
action characteristics. Although the URO’s decisions, like any other
state-created adjudicative entity, would be considered state action, the
Court concluded that a private party’s mere use of the state’s dispute
resolution machinery, without the “overt, significant assistance of state
officials,” cannot similarly constitute state action.92 Thus, even when the
state creates both the mechanism and the procedures through which a
deprivation may occur and, by so doing, encourages parties to use it, the
Court will not find state action.93
Sullivan clarifies the state action entanglement exception, at least for
cases that do not involve discrimination against members of a racial
minority. Sullivan states that government entanglement alone is not
enough to create state action. Instead, one must establish both
entanglement and state encouragement of the contested activity before a
finding of state action will be entered.94 Following Sullivan, a court
evaluating whether private parties’ use of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) or analogous state statutes to assist them in enforcing a private
arbitration agreement amounts to state action would examine the arbitral
process to determine whether there is government entanglement as well
as state encouragement of the use of the statutory scheme. Applying the
Flagg-Lugar-Sullivan line of cases to private party use of the FAA, or
90. Id. at 53 (citing Tulsa Prof ’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)
(“Private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state
action.”)); see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165–66 (1978); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
91. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53.
92. Id. at 54 (quoting Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486).
93. Id. at 56 n.11.
94. Erwin Chemerinsky, Narrowing the State Action Doctrine, TRIAL, July 1999, at 101, 102.
.
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state equivalent would result in a finding of no state action because states
make no effort to encourage private party use of the FAA nor do any
state officials assist private parties in utilizing the existing statutory
arbitration schemes. While this issue will be discussed extensively in
Part II, because a private party challenging the use of the arbitral process
on state action grounds might also argue for application of the public
function exception, a brief discussion of that issue follows.
B. Public Function
State action exists when a function that is traditionally an exclusive
governmental service is delegated to a private actor. For example,
running a political primary.95 and managing a town96 are both
traditionally exclusive public functions that are, on occasion, delegated
to private entities. When the government delegates, the question is at
what point along the public/private continuum the entity performing the
delegated function becomes the state and therefore must comply with the
Constitution. In evaluating whether an entity is performing a “public
function,” a court considers whether the activity is one that is
traditionally exclusively controlled by the state.97 In other words, a
private entity or person does not become a state actor simply by engaging
in an activity that the government could perform—state action attaches
only to those functions that the government traditionally has performed.
Even if the private entity performs a task of extraordinary importance to
society, courts cannot find state action under the public function test
unless the action is also traditionally a function of the state.98
Supreme Court jurisprudence on whether something is a public
function has resulted in a rather narrow doctrine. The Court’s use of
“exclusivity” as a means for determining whether a particular private
action is a public function resulted in a test that is very difficult to
satisfy.99 Nevertheless, a brief review of the major cases in which the

95. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
96. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
97. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see also, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 157–58 (1978).
98. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352–53 (holding that a public utility is not a state actor).
99. Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 319 (“[T]he exclusive state function test . . . is something
of an empty set.”); Schwartz & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 806 (commenting that no one can
satisfy the exclusive government function test).
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Court applied the public function exception is helpful in identifying the
contours of the doctrine.
Marsh v. Alabama100 is perhaps the classic example of the public
function analysis. In Marsh, private corporate agents working for and in
a “company town” arrested a Jehovah’s Witness for distributing religious
leaflets on the company town’s private streets.101 The Court held that
when a company opens its private property to public use, and the
property is designed for public use, the statutory and constitutional rights
of those who use the property will trump the company’s constitutional
right to exclude people from its property.102 In other words, the Court
will balance the private property rights of the owners against the
constitutional rights of people to enjoy freedom of press and religion
when the owners’ operation is a public function, built primarily for the
public’s benefit.103
Although Marsh is a case unlikely to occur again, given the demise
of corporate-owned towns, it explains that to the extent that a private
entity controls property or services that the public in general is invited to
use, state action is present. Yet this reading is quite broad and fails, it
appears, to consider whether the action engaged in is a traditional and
exclusive government function. In fact, many of the early cases applying
the public function exception did not address the exclusivity question. As
a result, at least initially, the public function exception doctrine was
fairly broad in its application.104
The contraction of the public function exception analysis is
exemplified by the Court’s holding in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
100. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
101. Id. at 503–04.
102. Id. at 509.
103. Id.
104. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (holding that a private park that received
governmental assistance cannot exclude racial minorities); see also Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing
Lines in the Shifting Sand: Where Should the Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Developments in
Establishment Clause Theory: Accommodation, State Action, the Public Forum, and Private
Religious Speech, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1998); William Brooks, The
Privatization of the Civil Commitment Process and the State Action Doctrine: Have the Mentally Ill
Been Systematically Stripped of their Fourteenth Amendment Rights?, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 55 (2001)
(noting that the Jackson decision emphasized the exclusivity requirement for state action);
Buchanan, supra note 16, at 364 (noting that Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases
advanced the public function issue until the Jackson decision); Jody Freeman, Annual Regulation of
Business Focus: Privatization: Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law,
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 842 n.82 (citing Jackson as articulating the current, narrow test); David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1257–58 (1999) (“Evans remains for all that
the high point of the public function doctrine.”).
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Co.105 In that case, the Court firmly established that the public function
exception applies only when the function at issue is traditionally an
exclusive state function. In Jackson, a customer claimed her due process
rights were violated when the electric utility terminated her services
without notice and a hearing.106 The Court held that no state action was
present even though the state licensed the utility and the company had a
virtual monopoly on the provision of electrical services. According to the
Court, only activities traditionally performed by or reserved to the state
would constitute public functions.107 Following Jackson, only the most
fundamental and essential services governments offer, which have no
private sector counterparts, seem to rise to the level of public function.
While maintaining company towns and running elections would still be
considered public functions, business activities, even when performed by
licensed or regulated industries, are not likely to reach the same level.
Interestingly, the application of Jackson to private party use of a
state-created dispute resolution process confirms both the limited nature
of the public function exception and that private party use of dispute
resolution machinery is not state action. In Flagg, the debtor contended
that the forced sale of goods to resolve a credit dispute is state action
because the resolution of private disputes is a traditional function of the
state.108 Emphasizing that few functions are the state’s exclusive
province, the Court concluded that debtor-creditor dispute settlement is
not traditionally an exclusive state function.109 In fact, the Court
identified only two exclusive state functions: election of public officials
and running a company town.110 Unlike the company town in Marsh or
the election of a public official in Terry,111 however, debtors and
creditors have “a far wider number of choices than has one who would
be an elected public official, or a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses who
wished to distribute literature” to resolve their disputes.112 In fact, as the
Court pointed out, section 7-210 is but one of several methods by which

105. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
106. Id. at 347.
107. Id. at 352–53.
108. 436 U.S. at 157.
109. Id. at 161.
110. Id. at 162 (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (discussing the election of public
officials); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (examining whether a company town can prohibit
distribution of literature)).
111. Terry, 345 U.S. 461.
112. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 162.
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Flagg Brothers could resolve its dispute. The Court concluded that, given
the numerous methods available to resolve the dispute, the legislature’s
delegation of the power to resolve disputes through the forced sale of
goods is not an exclusive state function.113
Under Jackson and Flagg, the Court holds that a private party
engages in a public function when it performs a task that is traditionally
an exclusive state function. Moreover, the Flagg Court explicitly held
that private party use of a statutory dispute resolution scheme is not state
action. While this Article will consider this question more fully in Part II,
at first blush it seems unlikely that the Court would find that private
party use of a statutory arbitration scheme would amount to state action.
II. APPLICATION OF STATE ACTION IN ARBITRATION
Having explicated the basic framework for defining whether state
action exists, the Article turns to assessing whether or not various forms
of arbitration involve state action. Arbitration can be characterized by
different levels of state involvement. This Article will examine three
forms of arbitration: (1) court-ordered; (2) agency-initiated; and (3)
contractual. With regard to each, the Article will discuss and critique the
commentators’ and courts’ conclusions on the state action issue and offer
an independent analysis on that question. Based on this critique and
analysis, the Article concludes that state action is present in courtordered and agency-initiated arbitration but is not present in contractual
arbitration.
A. Court-Ordered Arbitration
Court-ordered arbitration involves state action because the party
participation in the arbitral process is compulsory and required by a
government actor as opposed to a private agreement. Thus, court-ordered
arbitration must satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Courtordered arbitration provides for compulsory, nonbinding arbitration in
smaller federal civil actions, typically when damages claimed are less
than $150,000.114 For example, in Arizona, a federal district court
113. Id. at 161.
114. As of 1992, twenty-two of the ninety-four federal district courts, as well as thirty-three
states, offered court-ordered arbitration. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGRET SHAW, COURT
ADR: ELEMENTS FOR PROGRAM DESIGN (1992). By 1998, one-quarter of federal district courts had
created either court-ordered or voluntary arbitration programs. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE,
PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (2000). The Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651–58 (1998), requires every federal district court to
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mandates referral to arbitration for most civil cases when the relief
sought does not exceed $150,000.115 Similarly, in the Western District of
Michigan, federal courts must order civil actions to arbitration if the
amount in controversy does not exceed $100,000.116 In some
jurisdictions, the court appoints the arbitrator or a panel of three
arbitrators from a list the court created.117 In other jurisdictions, the
litigants select the arbitrator.118 The court or the litigants typically pay
the arbitrator fees, ranging from $100 per day to up to $300 per hour.119

implement a dispute resolution program, which may include arbitration, and authorizes the court to
create mandatory mediation programs. Court rules require arbitration in cases ranging from $50,000
to $150,000. See ARIZ DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11 (2002); CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 1141.11 (2000); N.D.
CAL. ADR LOC. R. 4-1 to 4-5, 4-12 (2002); M.D. FLA. R. 8.01-8.06 (2003); W.D. MICH. CIV. LOC.
R. 16.6 (2003). Mandatory mediation statutes or court rules are also quite common. See COLE ET AL.,
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 7:1 (2d ed. 1994) (describing extent of mandatory
mediation). Fifty-one federal district courts maintain court-annexed mediation programs. See STONE,
supra, at 4. Numerous state statutes mandate mediation for a variety of disputes. See COLE, supra, at
7:2 n.1. In Alaska, for example, a court may order parties to mediate child custody disputes within
thirty days after a petition for child custody is filed. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (2000). As with
most child custody and family mediations, the court would first screen the case to make sure that
mediation is an appropriate remedy for the parties. Pursuant to the Alaska statute, if one of the
parties is a victim of domestic violence, mediation will not take place without the consent of that
party after advice from the court that the party need not agree to mediation and that no judicial bias
will be created as a result of the decision not to participate in mediation. In mandatory mediation, the
court may pay for the mediation, or may require one or both of the parties to pay. Id. § 25.20.080(e).
Failure to participate in mandatory mediation will result in sanctions. As with court-annexed
arbitration, some states that authorize courts to order party participation in mediation provide parties
to those procedures one or more peremptory challenges to the mediator. For example, in the Alaska
statute discussed above, each party may peremptorily challenge one appointed mediator. Id. §
25.20.080(a); see also, id. § 25.24.060(b) (authorizing parties to peremptorily challenge any
mediator appointed once).
115. ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11.
116. W.D. MICH. CIV. LOC. R. 16.6(b)(i).
117. See, e.g., M.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.2(a), 16.2.4(a) (providing that the chief judge certifies the
arbitrator in such numbers as he deems appropriate and that the court administers arbitrator selection
processes).
118. ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11 (authorizing parties to select an arbitrator); W.D. MICH. CIV.
LOC. R. 16.6(b)(ii) (allowing parties to select an arbitrator from a list the court maintains or court
will appoint arbitrator); W.D. OKL. ADR CIV. R. 16.3 (Supp. 5.3) (parties may select arbitrators from
list supplied by court).
119. In Florida, the court selects either one or a panel of three arbitrators. FLA. STAT. ch.
44.103 (2003). Parties pay the arbitrators whose fees may not exceed $200 per day. Id. at 44.103(3).
In Arizona, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and the Western District of Michigan
federal courts, courts pay the arbitrator $250 per day or $250 per case, whichever is greater. See
ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11(g); W.D. MICH. CIV. LOC. R. 16.6(b)(ii)(d)(iii); E.D.N.Y. CIV. R.
83.10; W.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 83.10 (requiring $250 per case). In New Mexico and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the federal court pays the arbitrator $100 per
case. N.M. 2d JUD. DIST. LOC. R. 2-603 § 4(D); PA. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 53.2.
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Parties may or may not be allowed to enter a peremptory challenge.120
The hearing may be held either in a courtroom,121 a room in the
courthouse,122 or outside of it, such as in a lawyer’s office, for
example.123 Within some short period after the arbitration hearing, the
arbitrator issues a written arbitration award that is filed with the court
and served on the parties.124 That award is entered as a final judgment

120. In Arizona, for example, parties to an arbitration have ten days to exercise a peremptory
strike after notification of the arbitrator selected. See ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11(d)(2). Under the
Arizona federal district court rules, if one side exercises a peremptory strike, the arbitration clerk
will appoint another arbitrator. Only the side not exercising the first strike may peremptorily
challenge the second arbitrator. Each side is limited to one peremptory challenge per case. Id.; see
also ALA. B.R. 37(h) (providing that within ten days following notification of assignment to
arbitration, either party to attorney fee dispute may enter one peremptory challenge); ALA. B.R. 40
(noting that each party may peremptorily challenge an arbitrator assigned); CAL. CODE CIV. P. §
170.6 (stating that a party may exercise peremptorily challenge arbitrator); CAL. CT. R.1605(a)(3)
(providing that each side has ten days after notification of arbitrators CAL. CT. R. 1605.5 (providing
that local courts may have rules allowing at least one peremptory challenge); CAL. MADERA SUPER.
CT. R. 712 (stipulating that each party has right to disqualify one arbitrator peremptorily); selected
by court administrator to reject one name on the list); M.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.2.4(a) (allowing each
party to strike one of three names court clerk submits); KY ST. SUP. CT. R. 3.800(5)(B)(ii),
3.810(5)(B)(ii), 3.815(5)(B)(ii) (giving each side one peremptory strike for, respectively, legal
negligence arbitration, legal fee arbitration, and arbitration); N.M. 2d JUD. DIST. LOC. R. 2603(II)(C)(1)(b) (providing that after notice of court’s arbitrator selection, each party has seven days
to peremptorily strike one arbitrator); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 7002c (2002) (allowing one or three
peremptory challenges in voluntary arbitration—depending on the type of arbitrator).
121. M.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.2.4(b) (requiring that arbitration hearing be held in U.S.
courthouse); E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 83.10; S.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 83.10 (same).
122. ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11 (permitting only a neutral location or room at U.S.
courthouse); N.D. CAL. ADR LOC. R. 4-1 to 4-5, 4-12 (permitting arbitration hearings to be held in
any location, including room in federal courthouse if available); PA. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 53.2.
123. Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA
L. REV. 889, 900 (1991) (noting that the Northern District of California’s court-ordered arbitration
program holds hearings outside the courtroom, while the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s hearings
take place in the courtroom). In the Western District of Michigan, the hearing may be held anywhere
within the Western District. W.D. MICH. CIV. LOC. R. 16.6(b)(ii)(e)(ii). In New Mexico, the
Northern District of Ohio, and the Northern District of California, the federal court permits the
arbitrator to select an appropriate time and location for the hearing. N.M. 2D JUD. DIST. LOC. R. 2603 § 5(B)(1); N.D. OHIO LOC. R. 16.7(2)(A); N.D. CAL. ADR LOC. R. 4-1 to 4-5, 4-12. In Arizona,
a neutral location is selected. If a neutral location cannot be found, the arbitrator may ask the
arbitration clerk for a room at a U.S. courthouse facility. ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11.
124. See Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts:
The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787, 804 (1983) (“[a]fter hearing the testimony . . . the panel
renders its decision by promptly filing an award with the clerk.”); see also ARIZ. SUPER. CT. R. CIV.
P. 75 (providing that an arbitrator has ten days to make the award after receipt of objections by the
parties); CAL. IMPERIAL SUPER. CT. LOC. R. 7.05 (providing that an arbitrator has ten days, or twenty
if there is an extension, to make the award); CAL. SACRAMENTO SUPER. CT. LOC. R. 11.10(D)
(allowing an arbitrator ten days to make a decision); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. ARB. P. 10(a)
(stipulating that an arbitrator has fifteen days to issue an award); M.D. FLA. R. 8.05 (stating that an
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unless the losing party requests a trial de novo shortly after the award is
filed.125
The state action requirement is satisfied when a court enforces a
statute that mandates party participation in court-ordered arbitration.126
When a court, pursuant to statutory authority, both compels parties to
participate in a costly and time-consuming arbitral proceeding regardless
of their wishes and regulates the arbitral process, the arbitrator’s actions
during the proceeding are state action. Courts and legislatures have
recognized that state action exists in this context—to avoid infringement
of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, for example, courts do not
make court-ordered arbitration binding.127
arbitrator has ten days following hearing to issue award); KY. UNIF. R. BOONE, CAMPBELL,
GALLATIN, KENTON CT. GEN. CIV. R. ADD. A. (giving an arbitrator fifteen days to file award with
court and mail to parties); MINN. 4 DIST. CT. SPEC. PRACT. R. 5.11 (providing that an arbitrator has
ten days to file award with court and mail to parties); N.J. CT. R. 4:21A-5 (providing that an
arbitrator has ten days to render an award); E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 83.10(g)(1) (“The arbitration award
shall be filed with the court promptly after the hearing is concluded.”); N.C. SUPER. CT. MED.
SETTLE. CONF. R. 12(D)(1) (stipulating that arbitrator has twenty days after end of hearing or after
receipt of posthearing briefs to render an award); W.D. OKL. LOC. ADR CIV. R. 16.3 §5.9(a) (stating
that an arbitrator has ten days to render award); E.D. PA. CLERK P. HANDBOOK, PART 14(D)
(stipulating that an arbitrator shall “immediately” make a simple award that does not include
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or opinions); W.D. PA. LOC. R. § 16.2.7 (requiring that an
arbitrator shall “promptly” after the hearing concludes file the award with the court; in exceptional
cases, arbitrator can have ten days to render an award); PA. COLUMBIA, MONTOUR CITY LOC. R.
CIV. P. 2.02 (allowing an arbitrator twenty days to file award); PA. LACKA. CTY. LOC. R. CIV. P.
1301(g) (stipulating that an arbitrator has seven days to submit an award; written opinion is
discretionary); PA. ARMSTRONG CTY. LOC. R. CIV. P. L1302(d) (providing that an arbitrator has
twenty days to render decision); PA. CAMERON ELK CITY LOC. CT. R. 301(1) (providing that an
arbitrator has one day to file decision unless time is extended by the parties); PA. PHILADELPHIA
CTY. CIV. P. R. 1300(B)(4) (providing that an arbitrator has twenty-four hours to render a decision);
S.C. CIR. CT. ADR R. 7(b)(1) (stipulating that an arbitrator has five business days to write, sign, and
serve award to parties and file with court); E.D. TENN. LOC. R. 16.5(m)(4) (providing that an
arbitrator has 150 days to hold arbitration hearing and render opinion); UTAH ADR R. 102(1)
(stipulating that an arbitrator has twenty days to render award); UTAH DIST. ADR PLAN § 5(k)
(providing that an arbitrator has twenty days to render award).
125. For example, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, either party may seek a trial de
novo within thirty days after the filing of the award. See E.D. PA. LOC. CT. R. 53.2 (same); see also
ARIZ. DIST. CIV. CT. R. 2.11 (same); N.D. CAL. ADR LOC. R. 4-1 to 4-5, 4-12 (same); W.D. MICH.
CIV. LOC. R. 16.6 (same).
126. Reuben, supra note 5, at 1014; see also Sternlight, supra note 5, at 40 (“Where a state or
federal entity explicitly requires private parties to engage in binding arbitration it should be simple to
prove state action.”); Davis, supra note 5, at 605 (“where the government compels private parties to
engage in conduct, a finding of state action may be justified.”).
127. The New Mexico Supreme Court found that a regulation requiring title insurance claims
under one million dollars to be arbitrated violated the Seventh Amendment. See Lisanti v. Alamo
Title Ins. of Tex., 55 P.3d 962, 968 (N.M. 2002). In a Texas appellate case, the court held that a
statutory scheme that permits binding arbitration if one, but not both, parties request it, is a violation
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B. Agency-Initiated Arbitration

A more nuanced and complicated question is whether agencyinitiated arbitration involves state action. Commentators have largely
ignored the question of whether state action is present in securities
arbitration, and courts have answered it incorrectly since the SEC
mandated that brokers and dealers register with a self-regulatory
organization (SRO). This section will carefully analyze the relationship
between the SEC and SROs, as well as the relationship between other
agencies and the private parties they regulate, to establish that agency
registration requirements can, and often do, create state action when the
private party mandates that the registrant resolve disputes using
arbitration. Moreover, in the case of securities arbitration, the SEC’s
significant involvement in regulating and encouraging SROs to use
arbitration in conjunction with the requirement that all brokers register
with an SRO, means that state action is present in securities arbitration.
As a result, the securities arbitration process must be reformed to satisfy
constitutional due process requirements. Because this question arises
frequently in the securities industry, this article’s conclusion that
securities arbitration involves state action is helpful to understand to
what extent securities arbitration must be reformed. Moreover, by
analogy, the finding that securities arbitration involves state action will
be helpful in evaluating whether other types of agency-mandated
arbitration involve state action.
In the securities industry, all customer and nondiscrimination
employment disputes are resolved in arbitration sponsored by an SRO128
such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the National
of judicial delegation. Glazer’s Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Heineken U.S.A., Inc., 95 S.W.3d 286,
305–06 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). The court did not analyze the case for a Seventh Amendment violation
because neither litigant requested a jury. Id. at 306. But see Shimko v. Lobe, 2003 WL 1995650, at
*3–*4 (2003). See also Anderson v. Elliot, 555 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Me. 1989) (holding a state bar rule
requiring arbitration of fee disputes not unconstitutional under state constitution). Also, in GTFM,
LLC v. TKN Sales, Inc., 257 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 2001), the court held that a Minnesota statute
requiring certain sales agreements to be resolved by binding arbitration did not violate the Seventh
Amendment. In an older New Mexico case, the state supreme court held that a statute mandating
arbitration for discharge of school employees did not violate the right to open courts, but it did
violate the state constitution because of the limited review provisions. See Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad
Mun. Sch. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 527 (N.M. 1994). The Colorado Supreme Court, too, did not
find a constitutional violation in the state’s statute mandating claims of less than $50,000 to binding
arbitration. See Firelock, Inc. v. Colorado, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989). However, the court
relied on the fact that the statute allowed for trial de novo, making the statute something less than
totally binding.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1994).
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Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).129 Until 1998, SROs required
arbitration for both broker-dealer employment disputes and brokercustomer disputes. A 1998 rule change exempted the NASD brokerdealer employment discrimination disputes from compulsory
arbitration.130 Shortly after this rule change, the NYSE and numerous
other exchanges adopted the NASD rule.131 Although discrimination
claims have been exempted from arbitration, the existence of a variety of
nondiscrimination employment disputes132 and the possibility that the
NASD could reverse its decision to exempt discrimination claims from
arbitration ensures that the question of whether state action is present in
securities arbitration is still quite relevant.
Although SROs are responsible for protecting investors from
wrongful acts their members commit, they are not federal agencies.133 No
statute mandated the creation of these SROs, and the government does not
appoint SRO board members. Nor do government employees serve on
any NASD or NYSE board or committee. Nevertheless, SROs maintain
significant government connections. For example, the Securities
129. SROs include the major national securities exchanges and the NASD. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994).
130. Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange art. XI § 1 (2003) (“Any controversy
between parties who are members, allied members or member organizations and any controversy
between a member, allied member or member organization and any other person arising out of the
business of such member, allied member or member organization . . . shall at the instance of any
such party, be submitted for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and
such rules as the Board may from time to time adopt.”); NYSE R. 600(a) (2003) (any customer or
nonmember dispute with a member shall be arbitrated pursuant to written agreement or customer or
nonmember demand); NYSE R. 607 (2003) (all nonmembers and public customers with disputes
involving over $10,000 will have claims arbitrated by three-person panel); SEC Release No. 40109,
1998 WL 327716 (June 22, 1998) (associated persons are no longer required to arbitrate statutory
employment discrimination claims but must still arbitrate other employment and business-related
claims involving customers or other persons).
131. See, e.g., NYSE R. 600(f) (June 2003) (“Any claim alleging employment discrimination,
including any sexual harassment claims, in violation of a statute shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under these Rules only where the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it has
arisen.”).
132. When the NASD announced the rule change, it stated that “[a]ssociated persons still will
be required to arbitrate other employment-related claims.” SEC Release No. 40109 (June 22, 1998).
Nondiscrimination employment claims include, but are not limited to, the following: Family and
Medical Leave Act, ERISA, whistleblower, Employee Polygraph Protection Act, invasion to
privacy, disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, Fair Credit Reporting Act,
defamation, wrongful termination, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
133. Federal law requires the NASD to promulgate rules that balance the need to “protect
investors and the public interest; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6).
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Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for providing oversight of
the SROs.134 The SEC reviews existing SRO rules and may approve or
disapprove proposed new rules.135 Moreover, it can alter or abrogate
existing rules136 and may proceed against a SRO if the SRO does not
enforce its own rules.
Few courts have considered whether the close relationship between
the SEC and the SROs means that state action is present when an SRO
acts.137 Prior to the 1998 NASD rule change exempting statutory
discrimination claims from arbitration, however, several member
employees attempted to convince courts that the SEC-SRO relationship
transformed the SRO into a state actor, at least when it mandated
arbitration of discrimination claims. While the employees failed to
convince the courts that SROs are state actors,138 the arguments they
advanced support a finding that, at least since 1993, when the SEC began
mandating that brokers register with an SRO, SROs are state actors when
they require employees and customers to participate in arbitration.
To establish state action in these discrimination cases, member
employees relied principally on the excessive entanglement argument
articulated in Lugar.139 That is, the member employee claims that an
SRO becomes excessively entangled with the government when the SEC
moves from simply approving an SRO’s decision to require members to

134. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2003).
135. Id. § 78s(b)(1).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c); see also Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)) (stating that the SEC has plenary authority over SRO arbitration
procedures and has the power to “abrogate, add to, and delete from” SRO arbitration rules if
necessary or appropriate to enforce the Securities Act).
137. Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002); Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 1998). Every court has rejected the contention that the SRO requirement that
securities disputes be resolved in arbitration transforms the SRO into a state actor. However, no
court has analyzed the state action question since the SEC enacted its 1993 amendments that require
brokers to register with an SRO.
138. In both Duffield and Cremin, the courts found that the SRO was not a state actor because,
at the time the claimants began their employment with the particular SRO, the SEC’s mandatory
registration requirement did not exist. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185; Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
139. See Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1469. The Ninth Circuit in Duffield appeared to consider the
public function argument as well. Comparing the SEC’s role in regulating the SROs to the role of the
Public Utilities Commission in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the court
concluded that the SEC “has been no more aggressive than . . . the Public Utilities Commission in
Jackson.” Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1202. Thus, as in Jackson, no state action should be found.
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arbitrate to encouraging or endorsing that action.140 According to
claimants, the encouragement comes from the SEC’s ability to approve,
reject, or abrogate existing SRO rules. Courts rejected this argument,
routinely holding that the SEC is not excessively entangled with SROs
because nothing in the Securities Acts nor in the Commission rules or
regulations requires arbitration as a means to resolve disputes within
SROs, and the SEC does not compel SROs to utilize arbitration as a
means to resolve disputes.141
In attempting to convince the court that state action is present, at
least two litigants have argued that because the SEC compelled them to
register with an SRO as a condition of their employment, the SEC was
sufficiently entangled with the SRO to create state action.142 Both the
Ninth Circuit in Duffield and the Northern District of Illinois in Cremin
rejected this argument because, prior to 1993, no federal statute or
regulation required a member to register with the securities exchanges or
arbitrate disputes with the member’s employer.143 In 1993, however, the
SEC adopted a regulation that required all broker-dealers to register with
at least one SRO.144 Although the Duffield court characterized the new
rule as federal law, a “government-mandated ‘condition to any
participation in a . . . securities career,’”145 it nevertheless rejected
Duffield’s argument that because the SEC compelled her to remain
registered after the 1993 rule change, state action was present. According
to the court, that she was compelled to remain registered was
“immaterial.” The court went on to say:
No federal law required Duffield to waive her right to litigate
employment-related disputes by signing the Form U-4 [arbitration
agreement] in 1988, and no state action is present in simply enforcing
that agreement. Insofar as Duffield argues that the ‘challenged action’
is the requirement that she actually arbitrate her lawsuit, that
requirement is found in her private contract, not in federal law.146

140. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1202.
141. Perpetual, 290 F.3d at 132; Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 198; Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1182.
142. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201; Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1466.
143. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201; Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1466.
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (adopted May 11, 1993).
145. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1119 (1996)).
146. Id.
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The Northern District of Illinois rejected Cremin’s claim on virtually
identical grounds.147
While it is true that the arbitration requirement is in the SRO’s U-4
agreement, one might argue that if the SEC, with knowledge of the
arbitration obligation, requires a broker-dealer to register with an SRO or
compels the broker-dealer to remain registered with the SRO, it is
directing the broker-dealer to arbitrate his or her dispute. But winning
this argument is more difficult than it initially appears. In Blum v.
Yaretsky, a leading state action case, the Court held that a state is
responsible for a private decision when “it has exercised coercive power
or has provided . . . significant encouragement.”148 While the pre-1993
SRO rule requiring arbitration may not have satisfied the state action
requirement, the post-1993 requirement that broker-dealers register with
one of the SROs indicates that the arbitration requirement is state
action.149
Such a conclusion is not automatic, however. As the Duffield court
made clear, the requirement that broker-dealers register with an SRO is
quintessential government regulation. The next question, then, is whether
this government-mandated condition of registration with an SRO, when
that SRO mandates that the registrant resolve all disputes using
arbitration, is sufficiently overt or covert encouragement of arbitration to
support a finding that the SROs are state actors when they require
arbitration.

147. See Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1466 (examining law at the time Cremin registered, 1982,
not the post-1993 law).
148. 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982).
149. The Duffield court suggested this conclusion:
In 1993, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a
regulation that required all broker-dealers to be registered with at least one of the
securities organizations of which Duffield’s firm was a member—i.e., the NASD and the
NYSE—before effecting any securities transaction. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (adopted
May 11, 1993). That registration regulation, like the SEC’s registration regulation at issue
in Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1119, 116 S.Ct.
1351, 134 L.Ed.2d 520 (1996), “operates not as a private compact among brokers and
dealers but as federal law.” Id. at 941. Hence, to borrow Blount’s reasoning, as a
government-mandated “condition to any participation in a . . . securities career,” the
current requirement that new employees register with a national securities exchange
“constitutes government action of the purest sort.”
144 F.3d at 1201. While the Duffield court did not conclude that the SRO-imposed arbitration
agreement constituted state action, the holding that the registration requirement is state action
suggests that consequences that flow directly from the requirement would also constitute state
action.
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The D.C. Circuit examined this question when it considered whether
the MSRB is a state actor when it enforces rules governing municipal
securities brokers’ conduct.150 In Blount, the D.C. Circuit held that a rule
regulating the conduct of brokers that was promulgated by the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and approved by the SEC was
state action.151 The court found that the MSRB was a state actor when it
enforced its conduct rule because the Exchange Act requires brokers and
dealers to register with the MSRB before they may trade municipal
securities, and violations of MSRB rules may result in sanctions
including suspension or loss of the broker-dealer’s trading license.152
The court concluded that Rule G-37 was government action because it
was a “government-enforced condition to any participation in a
municipal securities career.”153 Under Blount ’s reasoning, then, a
registration requirement, together with regulatory enforcement of the
private entity’s rules, satisfies the requirement for state action.
The primary difference between the MSRB and other SROs like the
NASD is that the government created the MSRB but not the other SROs.
Yet the D.C. Circuit put this distinction aside when it assessed whether
the implementation of Rule G-37 was state action in Blount.154 If this
distinction is irrelevant,155 it is difficult to see a difference between the
SEC’s relationship with SROs and their arbitration requirement and the
MSRB’s decision to promulgate a regulation that effects the purpose of
the Exchange Act. After all, the SEC regulates SROs closely, and federal
.

150. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Rule G-37, at issue in Blount
restricted municipal securities professionals from engaging in “pay to play.” Id. at 939–40. In other
words, the rule prohibited brokers from making contributions to or soliciting contributions on behalf
of state officials from whom they obtain business.
151. Id. at 941.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The court said, “[w]e put to one side the Board’s
questionable assertion that it is a purely private organization even though it was created by an act of
Congress and directed by Congress to ‘propose and adopt rules to effect the purposes of the
[Exchange Act]’ within specified constraints.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)).
155. The distinction may be irrelevant both because the Blount court did not consider it in
analyzing the state action question and because it makes little difference as a practical matter.
Although Congress mandated the creation of the MSRB, it is an SRO that is organized as a nonprofit
corporation governed by Virginia law. A private entity does not become public simply because
federal legislation creates it. ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE §
9:7.4, at 9:103 (PLI 2001). Fippinger concluded that “the congressional mandate of the creation of
the MSRB, as opposed to its creation as a voluntary association of brokers, dealers, and municipal
securities dealers, has little relevance to whether the MSRB is private or public and governmental.”
Id.

32

1COL-FIN

1]

5/11/2005 11:34:45 AM

Arbitration and State Action

regulations mandate that broker-dealers from each SRO register with the
SEC. In fact, the considerable interaction and close relationship that
exists between the SEC and the nonmunicipal SROs suggests an even
stronger argument in favor of state action than in the Blount case. Further
examination of the connectedness between the SEC and the SROs offers
additional support for the argument that the SEC’s registration
requirement together with the SEC’s significant encouragement of SRO
implementation of SRO arbitration amounts to state action.
Notably, the SEC has not been a passive bystander regarding the
implementation of SRO arbitration. To the contrary, it has taken an
active role in developing SRO policy and practice. For example, in 1975,
the SEC created the U-4 registration form, which includes the standard
clause mandating arbitration of all disputes arising out of a brokerdealer’s employment.156 In the late 1970s, the SEC began pushing for a
systematic method for resolving small securities claims. In response to
the SEC’s initiatives, SRO representatives, the public, and the Securities
Industry Association formed the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA). SICA created a Uniform Code of Arbitration that the
SROs adopted in 1979–80.157 Although SROs are not obligated to follow
SICA’s recommendations, until very recently, they have done so.158
Another example of SEC involvement in SRO practice is when, in
1986, the Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,
ruled that federal securities claims could be arbitrated.159 In response, the
SEC sent a letter to SICA recommending substantial reforms of the
existing informal arbitration process. Among other things, the SEC
recommended that arbitrators should be trained in securities and relevant
state law, that a record of the proceedings be maintained to facilitate
judicial review of arbitration awards, and that the awards themselves
become more detailed.160 While SROs did not adopt all of the SEC’s
recommendations, they nevertheless instituted significant reforms to the
existing arbitration process.161 While the SEC approved these
156. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1971).
157. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 998 (2002).
158. Id. at 998–99.
159. 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
160. Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director of Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to
SICA members, reprinted in MARK D. FITTERMAN ET AL., SEC INITIATIVES FOR CHANGES IN SRO
ARBITRATION RULES, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1988, at 257, 279 app. A (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 601, 1988).
161. Id.
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reforms,162 it did not abandon its previous efforts and indicated that it
would continue to push for arbitration reform, particularly if arbitration
became an exclusive forum for resolution of securities disputes.163 The
SEC has continued to monitor the use of arbitration and has
recommended changes to the arbitration process throughout the 1980s
and 1990s.164 According to Professors Black and Gross, “the SEC and
SROs have spent considerable time and effort since McMahon to amend
procedural rules governing securities arbitrations.”165
The SEC’s active involvement in regulating arbitration together with
the reasoning in the Blount case suggests that SROs are state actors when
they require broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes following the SEC’s
1993 adoption of a mandatory registration requirement.166 Like the
brokers in Blount, arbitration of nondiscrimination employment disputes
is a government-enforced condition to participation in a securities career.
Thus, the arbitration requirement “constitutes government action of the
purest sort.”167

162. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock
Exchange Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses,
Exchange Act Release 34,26805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144 (May 16, 1989).
163. See id. at 21,145.
164. See, e.g., SEC Release No. 34,11424, 1975 SEC LEXIS 1592 (May 16, 1975) (form U4); SEC Release No. 34,26805, 1989 SEC LEXIS 843 (May 10, 1989) at 4 (during the past two
decades, “[t]he majority of the proposals to amend the [exchanges’ arbitration] rules were . . . in
response to the . . . Commission letters”); id. at 3–5, 7, 16, 22, 31, 32, 44 n.51, 51 n.59 (describing
the SEC’s ongoing series of letters to SICA, letters that presented the SEC’s recommendations
regarding the exchanges’ arbitration procedures, that “request[ed] [that the exchanges] amend their
rules” to conform to the SEC’s views, and that resulted in a series of proposed rule changes that
were “develop[ed] in response to the Commission’s letters”).
165. Black & Gross, supra note 157, at 1005.
166. Few courts have considered whether SROs are private or public entities when they
enforce their rules. In Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), a federal district court concluded that the American Stock Exchange acted as an arm of the
federal government when it conducted a disciplinary hearing. While the court found that the SRO
was a state actor, it nevertheless concluded that the hearing provided the broker-dealer satisfied the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1261. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Bernstein v.
Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 186 (7th Cir. 1984), held that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
was not a federal actor when it auctioned off a seat. The court emphasized that the private nature of
the suit as “only remotely related to the exchange’s enforcement functions” in reaching its
conclusion that the exchange was not acting as an arm of the federal government. Id. See William I.
Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment ’s Public/Private Distinction Among Securities in the U.S.
Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727, 770 (2004) (arguing that
entwinement of government with SROs satisfies state action requirement).
167. See Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
.
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Further support for the conclusion that SROs are state actors
following the 1993 amendments can be found in R.J. O’Brien & Ass’n v.
Pipkin.168 In that case, Pipkin claimed that the National Futures
Association (NFA) denied him his constitutional right to due process
when it required him to arbitrate claims made against him. The
Commodity Exchange Act, like the Securities Exchange Act since 1993,
requires persons who actively participate in the industry to register under
the Act.169 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
oversees the regulation of commodities trading and is also empowered to
register persons under the Act.170 The CFTC, as permitted by statute,
delegated the registration function to the NFA, a private corporation.
To support his motion to vacate the arbitration award entered against
him, Pipkin contended that the NFA is a state actor when it registers
persons.171 The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the NFA “certainly
is [a state actor] when it requires an applicant to agree to submit to the
arbitration rules in order to register under the Act.”172 Thus, under
Pipkin, a federal agency’s delegation of the required registration function
to a private corporation transforms the private corporation into a state
actor. That the private corporation creates its own arbitration procedures
and rules does not alter this conclusion. Instead, the court ruled that those
procedures and regulations are imposed on the registrant as a
precondition to registration under the Act.173 Because the registration
function is required, agreement to the procedures is also required, and the
registering entity becomes a state actor.
Applying Pipkin to the present situation, the conclusion seems fairly
obvious that an SRO, such as the NASD, is a state actor because the SEC
now requires registration with an SRO as a precondition to working in
the securities industry.174 Although each SRO creates the arbitration

168. 64 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1995).
169. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6f(a), 6k(1) (2005).
170. See Pipkin, 64 F.3d at 259.
171. Id. at 262.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The Cremin court was not persuaded by the plaintiff.’s analogy to Pipkin. See Cremin v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1466–67 (N.D. Ill. 1997). According
to the court, the analogy was inapt because Cremin signed the arbitration agreement prior to 1993.
Id. While the court left open the possibility that Cremin’s argument would be successful if she had
registered after 1993, when she would have been required to do so, it rejected her claim because,
prior to 1993, the SEC, unlike the CFTC, did not require individuals to register with an SRO. Id.
This decision is wrong for the same reason Duffield is incorrect—even if Cremin registered prior to
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procedures and rules, a registrant must agree to them implicitly when
she, as required by federal law, registers with a SRO. Additionally, as
discussed above, the SEC has a significant role in drafting, monitoring,
and enforcing the procedures and roles that the broker must agree to in
order to participate in the securities industry.
If the enforcement of arbitration agreements by SROs does constitute
state action, constitutional requirements of due process apply.175 While
subsequent decisions would have to flesh out the nature of the due
process requirements, at minimum, it seems likely that the arbitration
hearing would need to include a neutral decision maker, confrontation of
witnesses, compilation of a record, use of that record as the exclusive
basis for a decision, and a decision accompanied by a statement of
reasons.176 While current securities arbitration rules require a neutral
decision maker, a verbatim record, and a brief written decision, these
rules say nothing about the ability of parties to confront witnesses or
about other hearing issues.177 Nor do the rules mandate a reasoned
opinion. Instead, they simply require a description of the issues, the type
of dispute, and the damages awarded, if any.178 If state action is present
in securities arbitration, the arbitral process would need to be altered to
comply with at least these minimal due process requirements. Moreover,
as I have noted elsewhere, if state action were present in an arbitration
1993, post-1993, she had no choice but to remain registered. Thus, her obligation to arbitrate post1993 is the product of state action. See supra notes 138–49 and accompanying text.
175. Even if state action is present in securities arbitration, a claimant would need to establish
a liberty interest or property right in her claim against her employer before the due process
requirements of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment could be invoked. While not a simple inquiry,
Supreme Court precedent indicates that an individual’s legal claims, when those claims are created
by state or federal statute, would constitute a property right. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding that a terminated employee’s employment discrimination cause of
action is a property right that cannot be destroyed unless adequate procedural safeguards are
followed).
176. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Supreme Court stated that,
among other requirements, the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that a decision maker’s conclusions
regarding a welfare recipient’s eligibility to receive public assistance payments must rest solely on
legal rules and evidence adduced at a pretermination hearing. Id. at 264. Additionally, to
demonstrate compliance with that requirement, the decision maker should state reasons for his
determination and indicate what evidence he relied on, though his statement need not amount to a
full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 269–70. While a dispute
over the purchase or sale of securities or employment within the securities industry does not rise to
the level of deprivation of welfare benefits, some hearing followed by a reasoned written opinion
would seem to be required by Goldberg and its progeny.
177. See, e.g., NASD Rule 10214, 10326 (2003); NYSE Rule 623, 627(a), (e)(2003).
178. The NASD award must contain a summary of issues and description of the type of
dispute and damages. NASD Rule 10214 (2003).
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hearing, then a party’s discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge in
arbitrator selection would also become subject to constitutional attack.179
Interestingly, both the NYSE and NASD provide parties with one
peremptory challenge of an arbitrator.180 If a party can come forward
with evidence of racial or gender discrimination in arbitrator selection,
then the party should be able to present a challenge, based on Batson, to
a court following the arbitration.
C. Contractual Arbitration
Contractual arbitration refers to any arrangement whereby parties
agree that a disinterested private party will fashion a binding
determination of a dispute that has arisen between them.181 The parties
select the arbitrator who will resolve their case, typically making the
selection after the dispute has arisen.182 The parties’ active role in the
selection process enables them to choose an arbitrator who is an expert in
the subject matter of the dispute.183 Traditional arbitration also involves
179. See Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA
L. REV. 1145 (2004).
180. NYSE Rule 609 (stating that a party has one peremptory challenge that must be used
within ten days of notification of arbitrator names); NASD Rule 10311 (explaining that a party has
one peremptory challenge that must be exercised within ten days after notification). Both forums
allow an additional peremptory challenge “in the interests of justice.” See NASD Code § 22; NYSE
Rule 609.
181. See MARTIN DOMKE, 2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at 1 (Gabriel M.
Wilner ed., rev. ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter WILNER]. A typical statutory definition of
arbitration appears in the Texas statute. According to the statute:
(a) Nonbinding arbitration is a forum in which each party and counsel for the party
present the position of the party before an impartial third party, who renders a specific
award; (b) if the parties stipulate in advance, the award is binding and is enforceable in
the same manner as any contract obligation.
TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.027 (Vernon 1987).
182. See WILNER, supra note 181, § 20.02, at 301–09. Sometimes the arbitrator who will
decide the dispute is named in the contract establishing arbitration as the dispute resolution
mechanism. Id. § 20.02, at 308. Other times, parties simply state that an arbitrator provider
organization, such as the American Arbitration Association, will provide a panel of arbitrators from
which an arbitrator will be chosen at the time the dispute arises. Id. § 20.01, at 302–03. Of course,
even the latter selection method is, at some level of generality, one in which the parties select the
arbitrator. They have simply elected to assign their selection powers to an agent.
183. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (stating that parties select a
particular arbitrator “because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands” and
customs of the field from which the dispute originates); IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.2 (1994) (stating that an arbitrator is expected to be an expert in the norms
governing the resolution of the dispute). It may be that in at least some cases, one of the parties will
not want an expert to resolve the dispute. A party who has departed from industry norms in his
performance, for instance, might prefer an arbitrator who is not an expert in the industry in which the
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flexible procedures. The parties may choose the extent to which they
wish to be bound by formal procedural rules and may ultimately define
their own procedure.184 Arbitration proceedings, for instance, need not
follow the rules of evidence and often limit,185 or even eliminate,
discovery.186
These flexible procedures typically allow arbitration to proceed more
rapidly than traditional courtroom litigation. The time between hearing
and result is also shorter than in litigation because arbitrators are not
required to publish their decisions, and usually do not.187 It is also

party deals. In litigation, parties theoretically have little or no direct control over the particular judge
who will decide their dispute (although plaintiffs do, of course, to a large extent control the forum,
and thus can direct cases to fora that are perceived as more beneficial to plaintiffs). In arbitration, by
contrast, a party might act opportunistically by selecting an arbitrator the party considers predisposed
to the particular argument the party will advance. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that the possibility
of opportunistic behavior in arbitrator selection provides repeat players, with their better access to
historical information and stronger incentives to influence the arbitrator, a decided advantage in the
arbitral forum. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: A Case Against the Enforcement
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449,
453 (1996).
184. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 433–34
(1988).
185. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1955). The proposed revision of the UAA gives the authority to order
discovery to the arbitrators, unless the parties’ agreement indicates otherwise. See REVISED
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 13(a) (Draft Oct. 1997).
186. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., ARBITRATION 217 (1996) (“Another illustration of the
relative informality of arbitration is the sharply limited availability of discovery, both pre-trial and at
the hearing itself.”). The Uniform Arbitration Act does not provide for any form of pretrial
discovery. In fact, only the arbitrator has the power to order “discovery”—he may order it if he
believes it is necessary to resolve the dispute. Parties do not have a right to compel discovery. Id. at
218 (citing UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7). It is interesting to note that parties, when given the choice,
tend to agree to eliminate or reduce the amount of discovery, especially in light of the far-ranging
discovery that takes place in most formal judicial proceedings. The question emerges why discovery
is so different in the two systems. That is, why does our formal judicial system allow for such wideranging discovery if it appears that litigants, when left to choose their own rules, opt for less
discovery? There are at least two possible explanations for this deviation between the nature of
discovery in the public and private dispute resolution systems. First, little or no discovery is the
better rule in cases where parties have an existing relationship (i.e., the typical arbitration case), but
broad-ranging discovery is more appropriate in nonrelationship based cases. Second, the discovery
rules enshrined in the federal rules of civil procedure (and therefore also the civil rules of the vast
majority of states) resulted from a process of interest group capture, i.e., by attorneys interested in
increasing fees.
187. “Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.” United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960); see also Halligan v.
Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitrators have no obligation to
explain their award in writing). The American Arbitration Association’s Commercial Arbitration
Provisions contain a provision requiring that arbitrators provide a written award to the parties, but do
not require the arbitrator to explain in writing or otherwise the reasons underlying that award. See
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uncommon to have a transcript of the proceedings.188 Because arbitrators
rarely publish their opinions and are not obligated to follow precedent,
one can expect an arbitral decision within days or weeks following the
arbitration hearing.
Once the decision is issued, a party may appeal the arbitrator’s
decision. Judicial review of arbitral awards, however, is quite restricted
either by contract or statute. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which
governs arbitration procedure, limits the grounds for refusing to enforce
an arbitral award to procedural irregularities in the arbitral decisionmaking process, as, for example, in instances when the arbitrator has
acted in excess of her authority.189 Misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law are not bases upon which an arbitral award may be
reversed.190
Contractual arbitration, therefore, is traditionally a private party
arrangement. Court involvement occurs, if at all, prior to the start of
arbitration and after the completion of arbitration. First, the FAA allows
a party to obtain a stay of litigation pending an arbitration pursuant to a
valid arbitration agreement.191 Second, the FAA enables enforcement of
an arbitration agreement by authorizing a party to an arbitration
agreement to file in federal district court a motion to compel the other
party to arbitrate.192 The FAA also contains provisions for limited
judicial review of arbitral awards, together with provisions articulating
the process for vacation or modification of arbitral awards.193
1. Applying entanglement jurisprudence to contractual arbitration
To determine whether state action exists when parties seek judicial
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate or judicial review of arbitration

MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 183, § 2.6.2, at 2:37 (stating that arbitrators are not required to provide
a written opinion with reasons supporting their decision); WILNER, supra note 181, § 29.01, at 427
(stating that the parties to the arbitration typically set the time within which the arbitrator must
render his award); EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 324 (1997) (explaining that only in specialized arbitrations, like
labor, international commercial, and maritime arbitrations, do arbitrators write opinions).
188. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 640 (2d ed. 1996).
189. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (1992).
190. Federal courts have created additional bases for judicial review of arbitral awards. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (reversing lower decision due to arbitrator’s manifest disregard
of the law); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d. Cir. 1998).
191. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1992).
192. See id. § 4 (1992).
193. See id. §§ 10–12 (1992).
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awards, a court would first need to categorize arbitration as either racebased or nonrace-based. To obtain the benefit of the more lenient racebased entanglement test, a litigant would have to argue for a revival of
Shelley or contend that enforcement of an arbitration agreement or award
has a racially discriminatory impact. Courts would be unlikely to receive
either of these arguments favorably. If the Court had extended Shelley to
other contractual arrangements, an argument for its extension into
arbitration might have merit. The Court’s initial reluctance to extend
Shelley, however, followed by a hasty retreat from it, suggests that
reliance on Shelley to support an argument of state action in arbitration is
misplaced. That Shelley required explicit racial decision making lends
further credence to the theory that it is inapplicable in the arbitration
context when arbitration agreements and awards are facially neutral.194
Proponents of finding state action in arbitration might contend that
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards should be
characterized as race-based entanglement because enforcement has a
discriminatory impact on those protected by various antidiscrimination
statutes. Proponents might also argue that because arbitration is used
frequently in discrimination cases, it has an adverse impact on minorities
and, when the court enforces an agreement or award, amounts to
unlawful discrimination. While some may argue that arbitration and
other forms of dispute resolution systematically disfavor minorities, the
mere enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate is not discriminatory; it
does no immediate or direct harm to anyone. Moreover, a contention that
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards is discriminatory is
purely conjecture. No evidence supports the argument.195
194. Professor Barbara Snyder made a similar argument with respect to race discrimination
cases. In her article, she emphasized that state action exists when the court enforces a racially
discriminatory agreement or when the purported state actor admits that he took action for
discriminatory reasons, but not when the court enforces facially neutral laws, as in Evans v. Abney.
396 U.S. 435 (1970). See Barbara Snyder, Private Motivation: State Action and the Allocation of
Responsibilities for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1062 (1990). In
Evans, the Court used neutral trusts and estates law to permit land to revert to descendants of a
senator who gave land for a public park on the condition that no racial minorities would be permitted
to use the park.
195. In fact, the most recent empirical study suggests the opposite conclusion. See Michael
Delikat & Morris Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Do
Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, A.B.A. CONFLICT MGMT., Winter 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.arb-forum.com/articles/list-articles.asp. The researchers reviewed 125
employment discrimination cases filed in the Southern District of New York and 186 employment
arbitrations in the securities industries from 1997 and 2001. They concluded there was no statistical
support of bias against individual claimants in arbitrations pursuant to predispute arbitration
agreements when compared to federal court. Moreover, the study demonstrated that claimants in
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The case law also supports the conclusion that enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards is not state action even if enforcement
disadvantages protected classes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that judicial decisions that disadvantage racial minorities do not involve
state action unless there is some nonneutral involvement of the court
with the private action. Thus, in Bell v. Maryland,196 the Court upheld a
trespass conviction based on a private person’s decision not to allow
racial minorities on his property. Because neither the state nor the court
“prompted or required” the private person’s discriminatory behavior,
state action did not arise. Similarly, in Evans v. Abney,197 the Court did
not find state action when a court permitted land to revert to descendants
of a senator who gave land for a public park on the condition that no
members of a racial minority would be allowed in the park. The Court
found no state action even though racial minorities were disadvantaged
because the court’s only involvement was to enforce neutral state
property laws.198 Parties seeking to avoid an arbitration agreement or
award ask the courts to apply the FAA to determine whether they must
abide by the agreement or award. Like state property laws, the FAA is a
neutral enforcement scheme. Because a court’s only involvement in an
arbitration case is to enforce the agreement or award, the possibility, as
yet unproven, that the enforcement might have a disproportionate impact
on minorities is irrelevant under Bell and Evans.
Examination of the Court’s most recent jurisprudence on the racebased entanglement analysis in Edmonson sheds additional light on the
issue.199 In Edmonson, the Court found that state action exists when a
court enforces the peremptory challenge of a juror. According to the
Court, the approval of the challenge is state action because the court
“made itself a party to the [biased act and] . . . elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination.”200 The
government both “create[d] the legal framework governing the
[challenged] conduct” and has, in a significant way, involved itself with

arbitration were more likely to prevail than plaintiffs in federal court and that the median monetary
awards were similar.
196. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
197. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
198. Id. at 445.
199. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
200. Id. at 624 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961))
(internal quotations omitted).
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invidious discrimination.201 Although peremptory challenge of a juror in
court is similar to a peremptory challenge in arbitration, the major
difference—that the court’s approval of the peremptory challenge
occurred in court, utilizing the court’s power and involving the court in
the discrimination—would likely be dispositive. In the case of
arbitration, a court would merely approve a facially neutral arbitration
agreement or award. It would be difficult to describe the court’s behavior
in these enforcement actions as significant involvement with invidious
discrimination.202 Applying the race-based entanglement analysis to
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards will inevitably result
in a no state action finding.
Thus, it would seem that the most appropriate state action analysis of
arbitration would rely on the nonrace-based entanglement cases
discussed above: Flagg, Lugar, and Sullivan. Whether one applies Flagg,
the case in which no state action was found,203 or Lugar, in which state
action was found,204 the result is the same—there is no state action when
parties contract to resolve their disputes, even when they utilize the
courts to enforce their agreement or award. In Lugar, the state statute that
authorizes attachment becomes operative only when a state official signs
the writ of attachment.205 In other words, without action by the state, the
writ has no operative effect. By contrast, an agreement to arbitrate is
operative at the time the agreement is signed. No state action is necessary
to enable the existence of the parties’ agreement. That the source of
authority for sending parties to arbitration is private rather than public is
what distinguishes these cases from Lugar and, for that matter, Flagg.
The nonrace-based cases—Flagg and Lugar —are one step closer to the
state than the arbitration situation; until the statute is utilized, a creditor
has no authority to do anything. In the case of arbitration, it is the private
contract that enables the party or parties to act. The difference between
.

201. Id. at 624 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
202. Opponents might argue that the court’s action in turning the award into a court order,
violation of which could be punished by contempt, creates state action if the underlying arbitral
process was tainted in some way. Yet enforcement of the arbitral award does not involve condoning
racial discrimination. If a peremptory challenge was entered for racially discriminatory reasons, for
example, the effect of the improper challenge would not be evident in the award. There is no reason
to suspect, without evidence, that the ultimate decision maker was biased in any way. Thus,
enforcement of the award does not create state action.
203. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
205. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924–25.
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voluntary agreement and state direction is a fundamental difference that
serves to distinguish the cases.
Of course, one need not accept this argument in order to predict how
the Supreme Court would apply Lugar in a case involving arbitration. In
a typical arbitration case, a party seeks judicial intervention only if the
other party refuses to abide by the arbitration agreement or arbitration
award or if the moving party seeks to avoid arbitration or overturn an
arbitral award. If the court finds the agreement valid or the award
enforceable, it would require the reluctant party to participate in
arbitration or abide by the award. Only if a party to the arbitration could
convince the court that judicial enforcement of a contract or award is
similar to sending a sheriff to assist a party in seizing property, can the
arbitral party succeed in establishing its state action argument. Given
Flagg and the other nonrace-based entanglement cases, that outcome
seems unlikely.206
Another way to understand why an agreement to arbitrate disputes is
not similar to invocation of an attachment procedure that requires state
officials’ involvement is to consider how the Court might have handled
Lugar if it involved only the issuance of a writ of attachment rather than
both issuance of a writ and action by a state official to seize the property.
The Court’s emphasis on official involvement in property deprivation as
essential to a state action finding suggests that Lugar would have come
out differently if only writ issuance had been involved. If only writ
issuance occurred, the Court would likely view the state’s action as
“mere acquiescence” as opposed to the kind of official involvement
necessary to satisfy the state action requirement.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan 207 serves to reinforce the
notion that contractual arbitration does not involve state action. In
Sullivan, the Court narrowed the state action entanglement test, making
clear that private utilization of a statutory procedure does not constitute
state action even though invocation of the statutory procedure adversely
affects a certain group of people.208 In other words, the Sullivan Court
closes the door on the argument that private party utilization of statecreated dispute resolution machinery is state action. Thus, Sullivan offers
significant support for the theory that no state action exists in arbitration
.

206. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 927 (stating that Flagg is different because of the absence of
“overt, official involvement in the property deprivation”).
207. 526 U.S. 40 (1996).
208. Id. at 54.
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because arbitration involves private parties using privately created
dispute resolution mechanisms.
If private party use of arbitration is not state action, the remaining
question is whether private party use of the court system to enforce
arbitration agreements and awards is state action. Lugar and Flagg
command that no state action is present when a private party uses the
court system to obtain a remedy (which may result in the deprivation of
another person’s property) unless a state official is directly involved in
the deprivation.209 Thus, judicial enforcement of a party’s motion to
compel arbitration, without “overt, significant assistance of state
officials,”210 does not amount to state action.
Proponents of a state action finding might further argue that the FAA
encourages private parties to use the court system to enforce arbitration
agreements and awards just as in Sullivan when the legislation creating
the UROs may have encouraged insurers to withhold payments for
disputed medical treatments. Yet, in Sullivan the Court held that “subtle
encouragement” of parties to use dispute resolution machinery does not
amount to state action, at least when the decision to withhold payment is
made by the private insurer acting alone. Similarly, then, a private
party’s decision to use the court system to enforce an arbitration
agreement or award is not state action even though a statutory scheme
exists that allows the party to obtain judicial action.
2. Public function
The strongest argument for finding state action in arbitration under
the public function doctrine is that arbitration is traditionally a unique, if
not exclusive, function of the state. In his article, Reuben contends that
binding dispute resolution, particularly arbitration, is “traditionally an
exclusive public function.”211 Reuben argues that because an arbitral
ruling is enforceable only after a judge enters the award as a judgment
according to the FAA or state arbitration laws, it does not operate
independently from the state.212

209. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
210. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 54.
211. Reuben, supra note 5, at 997–98 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375
(1971), in which the Court stated that the state has a “monopoly over techniques for binding conflict
resolution”).
212. Id. at 998.
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Actual arbitration practice rebuts this argument. Arbitration began as
an extrajudicial mechanism for resolving disputes.213 In fact, until
passage of the FAA in 1925, arbitration agreements and awards were not
judicially enforced. Instead, parties abided by agreements to arbitrate and
arbitration awards out of fear that they would be ostracized from the
commercial community and to preserve ongoing relationships.214 Even
after the FAA was passed, groups continued to utilize arbitration and
enforce arbitration awards without resort to the court.215 Thus, the
contention that dispute resolution is a unique function of the state seems
inaccurate.
Moreover, that parties may resort to the courts to enforce arbitration
agreements or awards does not transform binding dispute resolution into
a public function. Dispute resolution is different from the provision of
utility services or education because the parties, not the government,
delegate the power to the arbitrator to resolve the dispute.216 That the
court may ultimately become involved in the dispute does not affect the
analysis. Absent government delegation of the public function to a
private entity, state action under the public function test cannot be
found.217
The Flagg decision also supports a no public function finding. As
Flagg made clear, dispute settlement is neither a traditional nor an
exclusive state function.218 Moreover, according to Flagg, debtors and
creditors have numerous options in resolving their disputes.219 Like
debtors and creditors, employees and consumers have myriad options,
from mediation to arbitration and beyond, to resolve their disputes. That
negotiating alternatives to arbitration at the beginning of a contractual
relationship would be difficult would be irrelevant to a court, as it was

213. See Sarah Rudolph, Blackstone’s Vision of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 MEMPHIS
ST. U. L. REV. 279 (1992).
214. Id.
215. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relationships in the Diamond Industry, 21
J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
216. See Buchanan, supra note 16, at 345 (explaining that the public function issue considers
how governmental the activity delegated to the private entity is).
217. See Davis, supra note 5, at 610. Judicial enforcement of the arbitration agreement or
award is not state action because no discriminatory impact on minorities occurs. See discussion of
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
218. See Flagg, 436 U.S. at 157–58, 161.
219. See id. at 161.
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immaterial to the Court in Flagg.220 Thus, even under a public function
analysis that examines the breadth of options available to claimants, a
court should find that disputants subject to an arbitration agreement may
select from a variety of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to
resolve their dispute and therefore find that arbitration is not a public
function.
III. CONCLUSION
Judicial willingness to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims has left opponents with little recourse to challenge arbitration
agreements between one-shot and repeat players. While
unconscionability remains a legitimate basis for challenging one-sided
arbitration agreements, opponents of arbitration of statutory claims have
turned toward the state action doctrine as a means for infusing arbitration
with greater due process. Perhaps they believe that by increasing process
in arbitration, the results of arbitration will level the playing field for the
one-shot player. Or, they may believe that by making the arbitration
process more elaborate, fewer employers and businesses will select
arbitration as a primary means for resolving their disputes.
Unfortunately for the commentators who hope the state action
doctrine will save one-shot players from the perceived evils of
arbitration, the courts have resolved the issue correctly—there is no state
action in contractual arbitration. Applying current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, private party use of a private dispute resolution system
does not create state action. Nor is state action present when one arbitral
party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement or award. The FAA,
which provides the mechanism by which such enforcement actions
proceed, is a neutral regulatory scheme. No race-based decision making
takes place when a court decides whether to enforce an arbitration

220. One might argue that arbitral parties’ options are limited to arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution because they signed an arbitration agreement at the beginning of their contractual
relationship. Yet, the parties could have negotiated to resolve future disputes using any number of
ADR mechanisms other than arbitration. In that way, parties to arbitration are similar to the debtors
and creditors discussed in Flagg. The Flagg Court contemplated that the parties could have engaged
in predispute negotiations to avoid seizure of Brooks’ property under the state statutory scheme.
According to the Court, “Brooks has never alleged that state law barred her from seeking a waiver of
Flagg Brothers’ right to sell her goods at the time she authorized their storage.” Id. at 160. That
Brooks had little bargaining power at the start of her contractual relationship with Flagg Brothers
had apparently no bearing on the Court’s finding. Thus, the Court would be unlikely to characterize
contractual arbitration as a public function even though, like Brooks, consumers and employees have
little bargaining power at the time they enter into contractual relationships.
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agreement or award. Moreover, even if such enforcement has a
disproportionate impact on protected groups, courts still cannot find state
action because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that judicial
enforcement of neutral laws is not state action even when the result
disadvantages protected groups.
Although disappointing to antiarbitration proponents, the state action
doctrine, if it is to have any integrity, should not be interpreted
instrumentally. Constitutionalizing arbitration agreements and awards
might (although the evidence is ambiguous on this point) benefit
employees and consumers by increasing due process in arbitral
proceedings or discouraging employers and businesses from utilizing
arbitration as a primary dispute resolution mechanism. But
constitutionalizing arbitration agreements and awards would have a
deleterious effect on the law of contracts because it would be difficult to
distinguish agreements to arbitrate from other forms of contract
enforceable by private parties through the use of statutory schemes.
Thus, a state action finding in arbitration would constitutionalize many
existing contractual arrangements, interfering greatly with parties’
abilities to transact business. While constitutionalizing arbitration
agreements would have an instrumental value for antiarbitration
opponents, the slippery slope effect on the universe of contracts is
sufficiently problematic that, for both practical and doctrinal reasons,
state action should not and cannot be found in contractual arbitration.
Additionally, the mere fact that the court enforces arbitration
agreements and awards does not turn the arbitrator or the parties to the
arbitration into state actors. Simply put, the creation of a statutory
scheme that “permits but does not compel” private party action does not
create state action. Unless a state official affirmatively assists a private
party in depriving another party of his constitutional rights, that private
party is not a state actor when it utilizes the court system to achieve a
particular end.
Nor is arbitration a public function. Dispute resolution has never
been and likely will never be an exclusive function of the state. Private
arbitration and mediation have existed as long as the traditional justice
system. Moreover, like the parties in Flagg, arbitral participants have
access to numerous mechanisms to assist them in resolving their
disputes. The availability of alternative means to resolve disputes
establishes that dispute resolution is not an exclusive function of the
state.
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Court-ordered arbitration and agency-initiated arbitration, in contrast
to contractual arbitration, do involve state action. While it is not a
surprise to learn that court-ordered arbitration involves state action
because the court mandates participation in the process, that agencyinitiated arbitration could rise to the level of state action is a novel
concept. Although agencies might differ in their approach to arbitration,
at least in the securities industry, the 1993 SEC regulation that requires
every broker-dealer to register with an SRO, when all SROs mandate
arbitration of nondiscrimination disputes arising out of a broker-dealer’s
employment, amounts to state action. In the securities industry, the
government is exercising coercive power to ensure that broker-dealers,
who have no meaningful employment alternatives within the securities
industry, resolve disputes using arbitration. A finding that state action is
present in securities arbitration should result in changes to the securities
arbitration process. The current approach to securities arbitration does
not provide due process sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.
As a result, the securities industry should begin the process of amending
their arbitration rules to provide greater procedural benefits to parties
required to utilize arbitration. Parties outside the securities industry
should follow the lead of the securities industry’s reformation of the
arbitral process and continue the movement toward leveling the playing
field for parties in all dispute resolution processes.
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